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ABSTRACT
This article argues that it is no longer tenable to qualify the Court’s
non-discrimination jurisprudence overall as ‘poor’. Indeed, a
different speed of development is noted for the ‘prohibition of
invidious discrimination’ track and the ‘duties of differential
treatment’ track. In cases concerning invidious discrimination, the
Court tends to engage explicitly with the complaint in terms of
the prohibition of discrimination, while adopting high levels of
scrutiny in regard to differentiations on the basis of ethnicity and
religion. Admittedly, there are ongoing flaws in the jurisprudence
on the allocation of the burden of proof, and particularly the
identification of a prima facie case of direct discrimination.
Nevertheless, the Court seems to be willing to test the
boundaries. A markedly different picture emerges concerning
duties of differential treatment. The analysis of the selected case
law confirms that the Court avoids as much as possible non-
discrimination analysis in cases on claims to official recognition of
separate identities and ways of life of ethnic and religious
minorities. The Court prefers to conduct its analysis of the related
complaints about a lack of accommodation in terms of articles 8
and 9 of the ECHR respectively.
Arguably, demands for reasonable accommodation of different
ethnic and religious identities are on the rise in the current era
of globalisation. While the Court is not supposed to impose
uniform standards, it remains important that it provides guidance
about the benchmarks that contracting states need to take into
account when developing policies, legislation, and practices, in
order to live up to their commitment to respect fundamental
rights. Consequently, the Court is urged to engage more explicitly
and properly in non-discrimination analysis, also in relation to
complaints about a lack of differential treatment (accommodation),
while identifying and weighing the respective interests.
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I. Introduction
In the ever expanding literature on human rights, considerable attention tends to go to
the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. This is not surprising given its standing
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as the most renowned international adjudicator of human rights.1 Topics that have gen-
erated a rather extensive literature include the ECtHR and minorities2 and the jurispru-
dence of the ECtHR in relation to the principle of equal treatment.3
This article aims to move beyond the usual critique of the Court’s non-discrimi-
nation jurisprudence for being relegated to second-class status (a result of the
Court’s hesitance to conclude to a prohibited discrimination). The non-discrimination
jurisprudence at the ECtHR is accused of not having significant bite, and article 14 has
been named the ‘Cinderella’ of the ECHR.4 It strives to provide additional insights to
the existing literature, by discussing the different state of development (‘speeds’) of the
Court’s jurisprudence on the distinctive dimensions of the right to equal treatment,
especially with regards to ethnic and religious minorities. These
distinctive dimensions correspond to the two respects in which the right to equal
treatment is important for persons belonging to minorities, namely the prohibition
of invidious discrimination on the one hand and the right to differential treatment
on the other.
On the one hand, persons belonging to minorities want an adequate protection against
invidious discrimination, implying that they do not want to be treated differently, or dis-
advantageously, without reasonable and objective justification. On the other hand, they do
want to be treated differently in a manner that takes into account their specific character-
istics and needs, and accommodates their own, separate identity. When states fail to treat
differently persons that are in substantially different situations, without reasonable and
objective justification, they violate this second dimension of the right to equal treatment.
The related state duties of differential treatment can and need to be further divided in two
categories, namely (1) duties to stop and reverse invidious discrimination, and related
duties of differential treatment aimed at levelling the playing field in terms of ‘access’,
and (2) duties of differential treatment to accommodate the separate identity of minorities
and their way of life.
This article refines the existing overall analysis of the Court’s non-discrimination jur-
isprudence in two (interrelated) respects. First, it is argued that a closer look at the Court’s
non-discrimination jurisprudence reveals that several positive developments can be traced
in the Court’s jurisprudence pertaining to the prohibition of invidious discrimination.
While criticisms about the Court’s reasoning are still in order, inter alia in relation to
the sharing of the burden of proof, it is important to acknowledge that in several respects
1Inter alia S Wheatley, ‘Minorities Under the ECHR and the Construction of a “Democratic Society”’ (2007) PL 770.
2Inter alia J Ringelheim, Diversité culturelle et droits de l’homme. La protection des minorités par la Convention européenne des
droits de l’homme (Bruylant, 2006); G Gilbert, ‘The Burgeoning Minority Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights’ (2002) 24 Hum Rts Q 736.
The Court arguably embraces pluralism as an intrinsic characteristic of the ECHR. Nieuwenhuis argues that ‘democ-
racy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures
the fair and proper treatment of people from minorities’: A Nieuwenhuis, ‘The Concept of Pluralism in the Case-law of the
ECtHR’ (2007) 3 Eu Const 367, with reference to Young, James and Webster v UK (App no 7601/76) ECtHR 13 August 1981,
para 63.
3OM Arnadottir, ‘Cross-Fertilisation, Clarity and Consistency at an Overburdened European Court of Human Rights: The Case
of the Discrimination Grounds under Article 14 ECHR’ (2015) 34 iCourts Working Paper Series <http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2666951>; T Thienel, ‘The Burden and Standard of Proof in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 50 Ger YB Int L
543. Inter alia K Henrard, ‘Non-discrimination and Full and Effective Equality’ in M Weller (ed), Universal Minority Rights: A
Commentary on the Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals (OUP, 2007) 75–147.
4Inter alia R O’Connell, ‘Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Art 14 and the Right to Non-discrimination in the ECHR’ (2009) 29 LS
212, and see other references there.
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the Court is stepping up its protection, or is at least developing a more explicit and elab-
orate reasoning. In contrast, the Court tends to avoid an evaluation of complaints regard-
ing the lack of differential treatment.
A second refinement of the analysis needs to be made in relation to the latter category.
The Court’s avoidance of an explicit non discrimination analysis is particularly visible
when the demands for differential treatment directly concern the accommodation of a
separate (ethnic or religious) identity (sub-category 2). Typical examples of such accom-
modation would include measures of reasonable accommodation in the workplace, facil-
itating different ways of life, inter alia in relation to housing, and dress code in the public
sphere. The Court does seem more open to recognising state duties to stop and reverse
invidious discrimination and duties of differential treatment that concern redressing
past discriminatory practices concerning access rights (access to public functions, access
to education).
In other words, it is important to recognise that the court’s non-discrimination juris-
prudence in relation to the two distinctive dimensions of the right to equal treatment
has been developed at two different.5 This is a more nuanced evaluation of the Court’s
practice, which enables the formulation of more targeted criticisms of and more specific
recommendations for the ECtHR’s non discrimination jurisprudence. The latter is
beyond the confines of this article though.
The article consists of two parts. First, the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the prohibi-
tion of invidious discrimination is assessed in terms of the effectiveness of the protection
against discrimination. The analysis focuses on the levels of scrutiny adopted by the Court
and the evolving jurisprudence on the sharing of the burden of proof. The second part of
the article investigates the jurisprudence on state duties of differential treatment in terms
of the prohibition of discrimination. An in-depth discussion of the landmark judgment,
Thlimmenos v Greece, and its overall follow-up is followed by a critical analysis of three
significant judgements concerning ethnic minorities and a range of judgments on religious
minorities. While the analysis cannot be and does not claim to be exhaustive, the range of
topics selected arguably form a representative spread: different ways of life (housing),
Roma marriage, ritual slaughter, and reasonable accommodation in the work
environment.
5This more nuanced analysis also allows to move beyond the argument that the ‘poor state’ of the ECtHR’s non-discrimi-
nation jurisprudence and the Court’s preference to deal with cases in terms of substantive rights, is in important respect
due to the accessory nature of article 14 ECHR, meaning that article 14 needs to be invoked in combination with a sub-
stantive article. It is too early to tell whether the Court under the 12th Additional Protocol, complementing the ECHR with
a general prohibition of discrimination, will be more ready to evaluate equality arguments, particularly in relation to
duties of differential treatment. Indeed, none of the few cases decided so far under AP 12 turned on complaints
about a lack of differential treatment or otherwise envisaged differential treatment aimed at the acoommodation of a
minority identity.
Similarly, the analysis also second guesses another argument often heard about the Court’s choice not to investigate
the discrimination complaint when it has already concluded to a violation of the substantive article, namely that this
would be perfectly understandable, and a matter of judicial efficiency. While the Court itself had – especially in early
cases – acknowledged that the position is otherwise if a clear inequality of treatment in the enjoyment of the right is
a fundamental aspect of the case (Airey v Ireland [App no 6289/73] ECtHR 9 October 1979), criticism abounds about
the Court’s narrow application of this ‘saving clause’. Put differently, the ECtHR tends to opt for deciding cases on the
basis of articles other than article 14, even when non-discrimination is central to the case: O’Connell (n 4) 212. As will
be further demonstrated through the following analysis, the Court’s choice not to evaluate the article 14 complaint is
especially visible in relation to complaints about a lack of differential treatment.
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II. The ECtHR and the Prohibition of Invidious Discrimination
The prohibition of invidious discrimination dimension of the right to equal treatment
targets treatment which is disadvantageous for a person, for which there is no reasonable
justification. Invidious discrimination can take the form of direct or indirect discrimi-
nation. Direct discrimination concerns disadvantageous treatment on particular
grounds that cannot be reasonably and objectively justified. Indirect discrimination
refers to neutral measures with a disproportionate disadvantageous impact on a particular
group, for which no reasonable and objective justification can be put forward.
There is abundant literature on the initial struggle of the ECtHR to give the concept of
indirect discrimination a place in its non-discrimination jurisprudence.6 It is actually
through a spate of cases on separate education of Roma children (in several Eastern Euro-
pean states) that the Court gradually came to terms with the idea of ‘indirect discrimi-
nation’.7 These cases challenged the disproportionate presence of Roma children in
separate schools and classes for mentally retarded children, in which the children received
inferior education, including a reduced curriculum.8 In some of these cases the Court also
explicitly tied the prohibition of indirect discrimination to duties of differential treatment.9
Notwithstanding some ongoing flaws and lacuna in the Court’s jurisprudence, the more
recent case law reveals several promising developments, moving away from the traditional
reluctance of the Court to identify instances of prohibited discrimination. The Court’s jur-
isprudence reveals that complaints about invidious discrimination on grounds of race/eth-
nicity or religion are explicitly analysed in terms of the prohibition of discrimination.When
assessing the effectiveness of the protection against discrimination provided through the
Court’s analysis, two topics merit closer investigation, namely the level of scrutiny
adopted by the Court and the reasoning concerning the sharing of the burden of proof.10
The effectiveness of the protection against discrimination is closely related to the level
of scrutiny adopted for the proportionality requirement, one of the two criteria in general
international law to distinguish acceptable differentiations from those that amount to ‘dis-
crimination’.11 When the level of scrutiny is high, the monitoring mechanism is more
demanding in relation to justifications put forward by the state, and more likely to find
an instance of prohibited discrimination. The criterion that carries most weight in the
determination of the level of scrutiny for the prohibition of discrimination is the degree
of suspectness of the ground of differentiation.12 Differentiations on suspect grounds
are scrutinised strictly, which implies that states only receive a narrow margin of
appreciation.
6Inter alia O’Connell (n 4) 211–29. See also the analysis in K Henrard, ‘The Council of Europe at the Rescue of a Paradigmatic
Case of Failed Integration: About Roma, the Multidimensional Nature of Integration and How Promising Principles Can
Meet Flawed Application in Practice’ (2010–2011) European Yearbook of Minority Issues 271–316.
7Inter alia Henrard, ‘The Council of Europe at the Rescue’ (n 6).
8Some of these Roma-education cases also demonstrate that the dividing line between direct and indirect discrimination is
not that crystal clear: the difference is to some extent one of degree, more particularly degree of directness of the causal
link with the prohibited ground of differentiation.
9See the discussion of the Horvath and Kiss judgment below.
10Levels of scrutiny and the allocation of the burden of proof are indeed among the most salient themes when discussing
the effectiveness of the protection against invidious discrimination.
11Note that in EU law, this general justification formula only applies to indirect discrimination, whereas for direct discrimi-
nation the acceptable legitimate aims are restrictively and explicitly laid out in EU law (often directives).
12See also JH Gerards, Judicial Review in Equal Treatment Cases (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 2005) 84–93.
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In academic literature several factors are put forward to identify suspect grounds.13
Such grounds tend to concern (virtually) immutable characteristics, such as gender, and
skin colour. In addition, characteristics that are irrelevant for social performance (i.e. suit-
ability for a job, entitlement to public services, etc.) are also considered ‘suspect’, when
they are so fundamental to one’s identity that one cannot expect this characteristic to
be ‘shed’ simply in order to have equal access to goods, services, employment, etc. Further-
more, these grounds have a history of discrimination, and can usually be traced to deep-
seated prejudice and stigmatisation.
Following the above criteria, both race/ethnic origin and religion would qualify as
suspect grounds. The history of discrimination has been richly documented in relation
to race/ethnicity, and religion was the most prominent marker for discrimination
during the religious wars in the middle ages. Religion is furthermore an increasingly con-
tentious marker in the current era of increasing religious diversity. Neither race nor reli-
gion should matter regarding one’s functioning in society. While ethnicity/race are clearly
immutable, religion is arguably de facto immutable as it concerns a fundamental identity
characteristic for believers.14
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence increasingly included signals about the special opprobrium
attached to racial discrimination,15 and, ever since its seminal Timishev judgment, expli-
citly recognised race and ethnicity as suspect grounds of differentiation.16 In most cases
regarding invidious discrimination against religious minorities, and in particular in
cases concerning discriminatory violence, the Court adopts a de facto high level of scru-
tiny.17 However, the Court’s approach towards religion as suspect ground of differen-
tiation is strikingly ambiguous. In its analysis of article 14 in combination with article 9
the Court carefully avoids talking about religion as a suspect ground.18 In a 2013 case,
the Court chose to ignore the explicit argument that religion should be considered a
suspect ground of differentiation.19
13For a rather detailed discussion of factors that determine ‘suspectness’ see ibid 85–91.
14For a somewhat longer discussion see K Henrard, The Ambiguous Relationship Between Religious Minorities and Fundamen-
tal (Minority) Rights (Boom Eleven, 2011) 43–44.
15At times the ECtHR even qualifies particular instances of racial discrimination as inhuman and degrading treatment in
violation of article 3, and thus absolutely prohibited. The European Commission did so the first time in ECommHR,
East African Asians v UK (App nos 4403/70-4419/70, 4422/70, 5523/70, 4434/70, 4443/70, 4476/70-4478/70, 4486/70,
4501/70 and 4526/70-4530/70) ECtHR 76 (1973) 10 October 1970. The Court followed suit in a case on Roma, Moldovan
al and others v Romania (App no 64320/01) no 2 ECtHR 12 July 2005, para 111. See also, Cyprus v Turkey (App no 25781/
94) ECtHR 10 May 2001, paras 308–310. This has been considered as yet another pointer to race being a suspect ground
of differentiation.
16In Timishev, the Court used the formula that ‘no difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent
on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society built on the
principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures’ (para 58). In more recent cases the Court explicitly talks
about the need for strict or even the strictest scrutiny (concerning differentiations on the basis of race): see inter alia
Zornić v Bosnia and Herzegovina (App no 3681/06) ECtHR 15 July 2014; Georgia v Russia (I) (App no 13255/07) ECtHR
(GC) 3 July 2014, and the case law below on the sharing of the burden of proof.
1797 Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah Witnesses & 4 Others v Georgia (App no 71156/01) ECtHR 3 May 2005;
Begheluri and others v Georgia (App no 28490/02) ECtHR 7 October 2014.
18Note that the Court has actually hinted at the suspect nature of religion as ground of differentiation in some cases where
the complaint was about discrimination in granting custody to a parent because of the religious affiliation of the parent
concerned: Hoffmann v Austria (App no 12875/87) ECtHR 23 June 1993; Vojnity v Hungary (App no 29617/07) ECtHR 12
February 2013.
19See inter alia Stijn Smets, ‘Eweida, Part II: The Margin of Appreciation Defeats and Silences All’, Strasbourgobservers
<http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/01/23/eweida-part-ii-the-margin-of-appreciation-defeats-and-silences-all>
accessed. 7 September 2016
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The Court’s reluctance to explicitly denote religion as a suspect ground of differen-
tiation is arguably a result of the traditional line of jurisprudence under article 9 which
grants states a broad margin of appreciation when it comes to ‘religion-state
relations’.20 Nowadays religion-state relations always concern various religions and thus
differentiations between religions. When assessing differentiations between religions,
the Court cannot grant states a broad margin of appreciation in matters of church-state
relations under article 9, and at the same time acknowledge that religion is a suspect
ground under article 14, which entails a narrow margin of appreciation.
Interestingly, and as analysed in more detail elsewhere, the Court seems ready to reduce
the margin of appreciation left to states in relation to religious matters (under article 9).21
This would allow the Court to give explicit recognition of the suspect nature of religion as
ground of differentiation. The Court has hinted at the suspect nature of religion in a few
article 9 cases concerning particular regimes of recognition of and/or cooperation between
religions and the state. In Savez Crkava and others v Croatia for example, the Court empha-
sised that criteria that need to be fulfilled by religious groups to obtain a special status, enti-
tling them to particular rights and privileges, call for ‘particular scrutiny’.22 Similarly, in the
Magyar case, the Court called attention to the fact that state churches are increasingly ques-
tioned as potentially in violation of the ECHR, and this message also points to religion as a
suspect ground of differentiation.23 However, the explicit recognition of religion as ‘suspect’
is still confined to the Court’s analysis under article 9′s freedom of religion, and has not yet
been included in the analysis of the prohibition of discrimination.
Overall, the Court adopts satisfactory levels of scrutiny in relation to complaints about
invidious discrimination based on ethnicity and religion.24 Still, an effective protection
against discrimination also depends on the Court not imposing very high demands on
the claimant’s burden of proof. Over the years, various criticisms have been voiced
about the high baseline standard of proof the ECtHR imposes on the applicant, namely
‘beyond reasonable doubt’. The awareness of the difficulties to obtain proof of discrimi-
nation for a victim has triggered the development in international law of an alternative
or special allocation of the burden of proof in discrimination cases. Instead of having to
provide ‘full’ proof, the claimant only needs to establish a prima facie case, after which
the burden of proof shifts to the government.25 In cases which deal with the prohibition
of indirect discrimination, the Court has fully incorporated this special allocation of the
burden of proof.26
20This is indeed a formal, pragmatic answer which does not address the underlying question why the Court feels the need
to grant states a broad margin of appreciation regarding state-church relationships. See Henrard, ‘How the European
Court of Human Rights’ Concern Regarding European Consensus Tempers the Effective Protection of Freedom of Religion’
(2015) OJLR 1.
21See ibid.
22Savez Crkava and others v Croatia (App no 7798/08) ECtHR 9 December 2010, para 88. For a more complete analysis, see
Henrard, ‘How the ECHR’s Concern’ (n 20).
23Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and others v Hungary (App nos 70945/11, 23611/12, 26998/12, 41150/12, 41155/12,
41463/12, 41553/12, 54977/12 and 56581/12) ECtHR 8 April 2014.
24The Court becomes ever more demanding about investigatory duties of the public authorities, see inter alia Begheluri et al
v Georgia (App no 28490/02) ECtHR 7 October 2014.
25Inter alia M Ambrus, Enforcement Mechanisms of the Racial Equality Directive and Minority Protection: Theory and Four Case
Studies (Eleven, 2010) 27–30.
26The painstakingly slow acceptance of the concept of indirect discrimination went hand in hand with the use of this special
allocation of the burden of proof: see S Besson, ‘Gender Discrimination under EU and ECHR Law: Never Shall the Twain
Meet?’ (2008) HRLR 670–71, 679; O’Connell (n 4) 222–23.
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However, in relation to direct discrimination, and especially allegations of discrimina-
tory violence, the Court has been reticent to adopt the special allocation of the burden of
proof.27 This reluctance was clearly visible in the Grand Chamber judgment in the
Nachova case, concerning the killing of two fugitive Roma men by Bulgarian policemen.28
In contrast to the Chamber,29 the Grand Chamber rejected the special allocation of the
burden of proof, because it would impose a too demanding burden of (negative) proof
on the government (that no racial animus informed the killings).30 The Grand
Chamber did not accept that flawed police investigations as such were sufficient to con-
stitute a prima facie case of racial discrimination. It proceeded to make a firm distinction
between the procedural obligation to properly investigate such incidents, and investigate a
potential discriminatory motive on the one hand and the substantive obligation to refrain
from discriminatory killings on the other.31 The Grand Chamber in Nachova did identify
three relevant criteria for the use of the special allocation of the burden of proof: ‘the speci-
ficity of the facts, the nature of the allegations made, and the Convention right at stake.’32
Interestingly, in 2014, the Court was confronted with three cases of alleged discrimina-
tory violence, the comparison of which arguably provides insights into actual and potential
developments in the Court’s case law regarding the burden of proof. One of these cases
concerned alleged discriminatory violence by public authorities (Antayev),33 while the
two others addressed a complaint about a lack of protection by the public authorities
against racist violence by private parties (Begheluri and Abdu).34
Antayev and others v Russia concerns a case of alleged racial violence against Chechens
by police officers. The Court noted the detailed allegations of racist abuse by the police
officers concerned, as well as the more general picture of police abuse against Chechens,
as evidenced by a number of cases brought by Chechens against Russia. According to the
Court, these data trigger the special investigatory duty of the Russian authorities to inves-
tigate closely and where possible unveil discriminatory motives for this systemic police
violence. However, the serious allegations of racist insults by the police notwithstanding,
the police did not conduct any investigations into the possible racist motivation. Further-
more, the evidence presented to the court, internal police instructions which stipulated
that Chechen suspects need to be treated in a special manner, were supported by the
fact that in casu a special task force had been called for a minor offence.35
The combination of this direct and more indirect, contextual proof swayed the Court in
finding that ‘a prima facie case of racially based ill-treatment has been made’,36 and in view
of the lack of any (convincing) proof that the police violence was not tainted by discrimi-
nation. Arguably, the Court was presented with almost full proof of racist violence by the
police; the internal instructions, the detailed account of the racist insults and the severe
flaws in the investigations, in addition to the more general proof about the systemic
27See inter alia Henrard, ‘The Council of Europe at the Rescue’ (n 6) 281–83.
28Nachova and others v Bulgaria (App nos 43577/98 43579/98) ECtHR (GC) 6 July 2005.
29Nachova and others v Bulgaria, ECtHR 26 February 2004.
30ibid para 157.
31ibid.
32ibid para 147.
33Antayev and others v Russia (App no 37966/07) ECtHR 3 July 2014.
34Begheluri and others v Georgia (App no 28490/02) ECtHR 7 October 2014; Abdu v Bulgaria (App no 26827/08) ECtHR 11
March 2014.
35Antayev and others v Russia ECtHR, para 127.
36ibid para 128.
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nature of the problem. While the Court did not explicitly rely on theNachova-criteria for a
prima facie case, in casu the ‘specificity of the facts’ was markedly stronger in comparison
with the previous cases.37 Furthermore, in its assessment of the alleged substantive dis-
crimination in the Antayev case, the Court seemed to follow the Chamber-judgment in
Nachova, and emphasised the authorities’ failure to uphold their special investigatory
duty. While the distinction between procedural and substantive obligations regarding
the prohibition of discrimination has been firmly ingrained in the Court’s jurisprudence,
the Court seemed to acknowledge again that procedural and substantive matters are
intertwined.
Also in Begheluri and others v Georgia the Court accepted a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation based on a similar combination of contextual information about systematic toler-
ance by the Georgian authorities of religious motivated violence against Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and the evidence in casu.38 In Begheluri, a group of about 100 Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses registered a complaint about 30 instances of religious motivated violence by a group
of Orthodox extremists. The Jehovah’s Witnesses claimed that public officials that were
present condoned this violence, and that the 160 complaints that were filed with the
public prosecutor were not heard by the domestic courts, mainly due to the absence of
proper investigations. The evidence in casu concerned not only derogatory remarks by
the police officials, but also the severe flaws in the subsequent investigation, which
added to the impression that the authorities condoned this religious motivated violence.
In Begheluri, the Court clearly acknowledged the extent to which problems in terms of
the procedural state obligation concerning discrimination point to a substantive discrimi-
nation. More particularly, the lack of protection against ongoing violence and the sub-
sequent severe flaws in the investigation and prosecution of these violent acts are
causally linked to prejudices by the public officials involved. The Court summarily dis-
missed the Georgian government’s defence that the complaint would not be substantiated,
and found that there had been a substantive violation of the prohibition of
discrimination.39
In a third case on discriminatory violence, however, the Court refused to acknowledge a
prima facie case of discrimination in the substantive sense. Abdu v Bulgaria concerned dis-
criminatory violence by private persons against migrants. According to Abdu, several
severe flaws in the investigations into possible racist motives behind the violence were
due to prejudice among the police officials concerned. The Court was indeed critical in
its analysis of the investigations and identified multiple procedural flaws (i.e. the two
alleged perpetrators were skinheads well known by the police), and concluded to a viola-
tion of the prohibition of discrimination.40 However, the Court dismissed the complaint
about the discriminatory motivation for the flawed investigation as manifestly ill founded.
When comparing these three cases, the difference in outcome regarding the establish-
ment of a prima facie case of racial discrimination seems to turn on the specificity of the
case-specific proof that is available. In Antayev there is arguably almost full proof of racist
violence and government inaction (lack of protection) that is racially motivated, while in
Begheluri, the proof of a systemic problem, in combination with detailed information
37See also Makhashevy v Russia (App no 20546/07) ECtHR 31 July 2012.
38Begheluri and others v Georgia ECtHR, para 176.
39ibid para 179.
40Abdu v Bulgaria ECtHR, para 52.
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about racist slurs uttered by the police and severe flaws in terms of the investigations seem
persuasive enough for the Court to identify a prima facie case as well. In Abdu the Court
neither had proof of internal instructions nor of slurs uttered by the police authorities.
Nevertheless, the fact that the alleged perpetrators had police records, and strong contex-
tual information about both systemic violence against migrants and the systemic lack of
investigation in discriminatory violence arguably constitute sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Indeed, does this structural lack of investigation
and prosecution of racist violence not qualify as condoning racist violence, and could this
not be said to reflect a discriminatory attitude towards migrants among the police?41 Abdu
arguably shows the Court’s reluctance to identify a prima facie case of racial discrimi-
nation when this rests predominantly on general contextual information and severe
flaws in the investigations. Put differently, Abdu reveals that the Court is not yet ready
to employ Nachova I reasoning, and is hesitant to formulate specific criteria for a prima
facie case of discrimination. It may ultimately be very difficult to delineate and identify
objective markers for a prima facie case of discrimination, but the Court is nevertheless
urged to provide further indications about relevant criteria.42 As the relevant 2015 and
2016 case law has not shown signs in that direction, it remains to be seen what 2017
and following years will bring in this respect.43
In sum, the Court’s jurisprudence in relation to cases on alleged invidious discrimi-
nation arguably no longer reveals general reluctance to finding a prohibited instance of
discrimination. Indeed, the Court appears to be stepping up its levels of protection in
several respects. First of all, the Court has clearly developed a steady line of jurisprudence
revealing a high level of scrutiny for disadvantageous treatment on the basis of race/eth-
nicity and religion. It may be more explicit about the suspect nature of race in comparison
to religion, but de facto similar levels of scrutiny are evident. Second, the Court seems to be
– slowly but surely –more willing to share the burden of proof in discrimination cases. In
particular, more recent case law reveals that the Court is in some cases ready to identify a
prima facie case of direct discrimination on grounds of ethnicity and/or religion. Admit-
tedly, the Court still needs to develop further criteria in this respect, since the Court only
accepts a prima facie case when there is very strong proof.
As the following analysis will reveal, a different picture emerges regarding duties of
differential treatment. The relevant case law pertaining to ethnic and religious minorities
reveals the Court’s reluctance to identify duties of differential treatment, and investigate
and evaluate such complaints under the prohibition of discrimination.
41In Eremia v the Republic of Moldova (App no 3564/11) ECtHR 28 May 2013, the Court was willing to impute discriminatory
intent to the government because of the officials had been aware of the domestic violence against the complainant and
had done nothing to protect her. See also D Petrova, ‘Evolving Strasbourg Jurisprudence on Domestic Violence: Recog-
nising Institutional Sexism’, blog post, Oxford Human Rights Hub: A Global Perspective on Human Rights, 20 June 2013
<http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/evolving-strasbourg-jurisprudence-on-domestic-violence-recognising-institutional-sexism/>
accessed 9 September 2016..
42See also Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, ‘Non-discrimination under Article 14 ECHR: The Burden of Proof’ (2007) 51 Scandinavian
Studies in Law 14, 17.
43For a discussion of relevant cases in 2016, see K Henrard, ‘Noot bij RB v Hungary (12 April 2016), Sakir v Greece (24 March
2016) and MC and AC v Romenia (12 April 2016)’, EHRM 12060/12, EHRC Doc No 2016/165. The Court becomes increas-
ingly demanding about the investigatory duty of the state, but remains reluctant to establish a link between the deficient
investigation and institutional discrimination within the police.
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III. Duties of Differential Treatment: The Impact of the Thlimmenos Case
The ECtHR was traditionally focused on scrutinising whether or not a differential treat-
ment can be considered legitimate. The Court’s baseline was thus a formal conception
of equality, following which persons or situations that are analogously placed are to be
treated identically.44 Nevertheless, the Court had already indicated in the 1968 Belgian
Linguistics case that the prohibition of discrimination does not prohibit states from treat-
ing groups differently in order to correct factual inequalities.45 The Court even added that
‘in certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through different treat-
ment may, without an objective and reasonable justification, give rise to a breach’ of the
prohibition of discrimination. Nevertheless, it is the Court’s Thlimmenos judgment that is
considered the landmark case establishing duties of differential treatment under the pro-
hibition of discrimination.
Thlimmenos was a Jehovah’s Witness who had studied to become a chartered accoun-
tant, but who could not obtain a licence, because of convictions for refusing to serve in the
military for religious reasons. He argued that the Greek law on chartered accountants did
not distinguish between convictions that are due to the exercise of one’s fundamental right
to manifest one’s religion, and other convictions, and that the Greek state had therefore
discriminated against him on grounds of religion. The Court follows this line of reasoning
and opines that it:
…has so far considered that the right under Article 14 not to be discriminated against in the
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is violated when States treat dif-
ferently persons in analogous situations without providing an objective and reasonable jus-
tification (see the Inze judgment cited above, p. 18, § 41). However, the Court considers that
this is not the only facet of the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14. The right not to be
discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also
violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently
persons whose situations are significantly different.46
Interestingly, in post-Thlimmenos cases the Court acknowledged the inherent link
between the Thlimmenos line on duties of differential treatment to the duties to correct
factual inequalities as found in the Belgian Linguistics case. The Court arguably considers
the Thlimmenos rationale a corrective mechanism, similar to the ‘redress of disadvantages
from the past’ rationale that underlies afﬁrmative action measures. Sometimes, the Court
identiﬁes duties of differential treatment that aim at levelling the playing ﬁeld, without
mentioning either the Thlimmenos formula nor the ‘correcting factual inequalities’ line.
In Horvath and Kiss for example, a case pertaining to Roma’s disproportionate sidelining
to separate and inferior education, the Court afﬁrmatively identiﬁed duties of differential
treatment, in response to the lingering effects of this indirect discrimination.47 According
to the Court:
44O’Connell (n 4) 212.
45Actually para 10 of the Belgian Linguistics ((App no 1474/62) ECtHR 23 July 1968) judgment states: ‘the competent
national authorities are frequently confronted with situations and problems, which, on account of differences inherent
therein, call for different legal solutions, moreover, certain legal inequalities tend only to correct factual inequalities.’ It is
the Court itself that adds this paragraph to its references with ‘duties to correct factual inequalities’ line.
46Thlimmenos v Greece (App no 34369/97) ECtHR 6 April 2000, para 47.
47Horvath and Kiss v Hungary (App no 11146/11) ECtHR 29 January 2013.
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In the context of the right to education of members of groups which suffered past discrimi-
nation in education with continuing effects, structural deficiencies call for the implemen-
tation of positive measures in order, inter alia, to assist the applicants with any difficulties
they encountered in following the school curriculum [… ] The Court would note in this
context Recommendation no. R(2000)4 of the Committee of Ministers (see paragraph 72
above) according to which appropriate support structures should be set up in order to
enable Roma/Gypsy children to benefit, in particular through positive action, from equal
opportunities at school.48
Overall, the Court has only in a few cases actually identiﬁed duties of differential treat-
ment.49 In the past it may have been reasonable to argue that the slow development of
the Thlimmenos rationale is intrinsically related to the Court’s longstanding uneasy
relationship with indirect discrimination.50 Indeed, there is a close connection between
duties of differential treatment and indirect discrimination.51 The disproportionate
impact of neutral rules on particular groups tends to be related to their speciﬁc circum-
stances, the extent to which persons belonging to these groups are differentially situated.
This disparate impact can be remedied by differential treatment, such as exemptions or
special rules adapted to the particular circumstances of the group concerned.52 These
instances of ‘differential treatment’ would follow the Thlimmenos rationale to treat
persons in substantively different situations differently (failing a reasonable, objective jus-
tiﬁcation for the disparate impact). Notwithstanding the Court’s ﬁrm stance on the pro-
hibition of indirect discrimination, this has so far not entailed a signiﬁcant increase in the
use of the Thlimmenos rationale.53
A closer look at the Court’s case law reveals that the Court is more likely to identify
duties of differential treatment with ‘levelling the playing field’ as underlying rationale,
than the need to accommodate the separate identity of ethnic and religious minorities.
For example, in the Thlimmenos case, the duty of differential treatment did not directly
concern the expression of a separate identity, a separate way of life,54 and did not imply
far reaching positive state obligations, nor entail an adaptation of structures or working
hours.55 Instead, the Court imposed a differentiation to ensure that the Greek Law did
not overreach and adversely affect certain persons – someone convicted for refusing
48ibid para 104.
49It should be highlighted that sometimes the Court restates the ‘correcting factual inequalities’ formula in an empty way,
without actually making use of it in the application of the facts, or in an obscure way where it is not clear what the quote
is intended to convey. Three judgments on minorities do contain ‘correcting factual inequalities’ language but the cases
actually concern instances of invidious discrimination against the minority group concerned: Religionsgemeinschaft der
Zeugen Jehovas and others v Austria (App no 40825/98) ECtHR 31 July 2008, para 98; Andrejeva v Lativa (App no
55707/00) ECtHR 18 February 2009, para 87; Orsus v Croatia ((App no15766/03) ECtHR 16 March 2010, para 156 ff.
50Inter alia K Henrard, ‘A Patchwork of “Successful” and “Missed” Synergies in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR’ in K Henrard
and R Dunbar (eds), Synergies in Minority Protection (CUP, 2008) 319–20.
51See also F Ast, ‘Indirect Discrimination as a Means of Protecting Pluralism: Challenges and Limits’ in Ast (ed), Institutional
Accommodation and the Citizen: Legal and Political Interaction in a Pluralist Society (Council of Europe Publishing, 2009) 97.
52Admittedly, the disparate impact can also be remedied by reshaping the rules to make them inherently more flexible, so
that they ‘fit’ persons with various profiles, or even by ‘levelling down’ so that even fewer people benefit. See also Ast,
‘Indirect Discrimination’ (n 51) 96.
53There is a slow, but certain development in cases on Roma and problems regarding access to quality education (versus
separate education) and regarding housing/accommodation: inter alia Henrard, ‘The Council of Europe at the Rescue’ (n
6) 271.
54It is interesting to note that in Thlimmenos the Court, after having concluded to a violation of article 14 in combination
with article 9, did not consider it necessary to also assess whether there has been a violation of article 9 taken on its own
(para 53): compare with the argumentation on the avoidance of article 14 analysis in this article.
55See also below on duties of reasonable accommodation on religious grounds.
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military service for religious reasons is not a person without moral virtue.56 Similarly, the
Court identified a special investigatory duty to unveil possible discriminatory motives of
violence against vulnerable groups. This duty is clearly not about accommodating special
identity-related needs, but rather about acknowledging the problematic nature of discri-
minatory violence in democratic societies. In order to effectively combat and prevent
this type of violence the authorities must level the playing field by conducting thorough
investigations into such incidents.
The language of (duties of) differential treatment to ‘correct factual inequalities’ in the
Belgian Linguistics case also refers to affirmative action, understood as measures of redress
for previously incurred disadvantages.57 The Court applied the ‘correcting factual inequal-
ities’ line in a string of cases regarding differentiations on the basis of gender; more par-
ticularly in cases of differential pension ages and the availability of pensions to the
surviving spouse.58 While these cases do not mention a duty to adopt these differential
measures, it is striking that the Court accepted the differential treatment adopted by the
national government because it aimed at compensating differences between men’s and
women’s working lives, which is arguably the same rationale as ‘levelling the playing
field’. The identification in Horath and Kiss of positive action duties in order to address
the long-lasting effects of past discrimination in education similarly fits this rationale.
The following paragraphs turn to the reasoning of the Court in some prominent cases
in which ethnic and religious minorities complain about a lack of differential treatment
that may accommodate their separate identity. The following section will focus on
ethnic minorities, and section III(2) will discuss the Court’s jurisprudence on cases with
religious minorities. My analysis of the Court’s reasoning in these cases will confirm
that the Court has adopted different approaches to duties of differential treatment depend-
ing on their underlying rationale.
III(1) Thlimmenos and its ’non-use’ in cases on ethnic minorities ’own way of
life’: Chapman, Winterstein versus Munos Diaz
This section will analyse three cases which concern Roma, an ethnic minority with distinc-
tive cultural traits and its own way of life. A comparison of the three cases clearly reveals
that on the one hand the Court is reluctant to evaluate Roma’s demands about the recog-
nition and accommodation of their own way of life (e.g. the custom of living in caravans)
in terms of the prohibition of discrimination. On the other hand, the Court is willing to
identify an unjustified differential treatment when in the evaluation of Roma marriages as
marriages in good faith, the cultural specificities of the Roma minority are not duly taken
into account. Put differently, as long as the separate identity is factored in for ‘levelling the
playing field’, the Court is willing to engage in a non-discrimination analysis. However,
56Thlimmenos ECtHR, para 47.
57Inter alia O de Schutter, ‘Three Models of Equality and European Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2007) 57 NILQ 34.
58In several subsequent cases in which the Court use the ‘correcting factual inequalities’ and the possibility of duties of this
type of differential treatment, this actually only features in the review of ‘general principles’ of the Court’s case law, and is
not followed by an application to the facts of the case concerned: Inter alia DH and others v Czech Republic (App no 57325/
00) ECtHR 13 November 2007, para 175; Andrejeva v Latvia (App no 55707/00) ECtHR 18 February 2009, para 28; Munoz
Diaz v Spain (App no 49151/07) ECtHR 8 December 2009, para 48; Orsus ea v Croatia ((App no 15766/03) ECtHR 16 March
2010, para 149.
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when a case turns directly on the accommodation of the separate minority identity, the
Court avoids an explicit non-discrimination analysis.
The Court’s reluctance to engage with duties of differential treatment aimed at the
accommodation of minorities’ separate identity in terms of the prohibion of discrimi-
nation is strikingly visible in Chapman, pronounced only a few months after Thlimmenos.
In Chapman, the Court identified de facto duties of differential treatment towards Roma
so as to ‘facilitate the Gypsy way of life’, in accordance with article 8 of the ECHR.59
According to the Court:
…although the fact of belonging to a minority with a traditional lifestyle different from that of
the majority does not confer an immunity from general laws intended to safeguard the assets
of the community as a whole […] it may have an incidence on the manner in which such laws
are to be implemented […] the vulnerable position of Gypsies as a minority means that some
special consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in the
relevant regulatory planning framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases.60
In other words, the Court hints at the need to adopt Roma-speciﬁc standards as part of the
legislative framework and to make individual decisions that cater to their speciﬁc needs
and vulnerabilities. However, both types of ‘special measures’ or differential treatment
are only identiﬁed in terms of article 8 of the ECHR, and the Court summarily dismissed
the discrimination complaint based on the Thlimmenos rationale. The Court found an
objective and reasonable justiﬁcation for not treating the Roma differently in the appli-
cation of the UK’s general planning framework: ‘having regard to its ﬁndings above
under Article 8 of the Convention that any interference of the applicant’s rights was pro-
portionate to the legitimate aim of preservation of the environment.’61 Put differently, the
Court did not conduct an explicit non-discrimination analysis, ostensibly based on the
assumption that the non-discrimination analysis covers exactly the same ground as an
analysis in terms of article 8.62
InWinterstein v France, a more recent judgment on gens de voyage, a population group
in many respects similar to the Roma, in a case based on an expulsion order due to illegal
placing of caravans, the Court further develops the jurisprudence from the Chapman case.
The Court restates the guiding principles from Chapman that minorities are entitled to a
traditional way of life in terms of article 8 ECHR, and that their needs and special lifestyle
need to be taken into account both in the regulatory framework and in reaching decisions
in individual cases. In several respects the Court’s proportionality analysis in Winterstein
sets a higher proportionality standard than in Chapman. InWinterstein, the Court de facto
reduces the state’s margin of appreciation of the state because the rights concerned are
crucial for their identity. The Court further highlights that the national authorities,
when balancing the rights of persons belonging to a minority with public interests,
need to properly weigh the group dimension of the minority, and the history of peaceful
residence. The illegality of the residence should not be decisive.63 Furthermore, the Court
59Chapman v UK (App no 27238/95) ECtHR 18 January 2001.
60ibid para 96.
61ibid para 129.
62The Court had even suggested that ‘to accord to a Gypsy who has unlawfully stationed a caravan site at a particular place
different treatment from that accorded to non-Gypsies […] would raise substantial problems under Article 14 of the Con-
vention’ (Chapman ECtHR, para 95). For a critical analysis see J Ringelheim, ‘Chapman Redux: The ECtHR and Roma Tra-
ditional Lifestyle’ in E Brems (ed), Diversity and European Human Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR (CUP, 2013) 434.
63Winterstein et al v France (App no 27013/07) ECtHR 17 October 2013, para 150–52.
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claimed that the state has a duty to offer alternative housing: the state should give due con-
sideration to the needs of the Roma as a disadvantaged and vulnerable group and also of
their needs as a minority with a separate identity and lifestyle.64 Considering the flaws in
respect of the above principles, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of
article 8. The Court’s evaluation of this case strengthens the extent to which article 8 pro-
tects the separate identity and lifestyle of the Roma, and is surely a welcome development.
However, the Court still refused to discuss concerns about the accommodation of different
lifestyles in terms of article 14′s prohibition of discrimination.65 Seemingly, the Court
prefers to pretend that an analysis of article 14 does not present any new questions to
be deliberated by the Court, so that an analysis of the article 14 claim would not add any-
thing to the case.
Interestingly, the Munos Diaz v Spain case66 demonstrates that the Court follows the
same reasoning as in the Chapman case in response to complaints about invidious dis-
crimination, but does not engage in a non-discrimination analysis regarding a complaint
that centrally revolves around a distinctive religious identity. The Munoz Diaz case con-
cerns a double discrimination complaint by a widow because of the lack of recognition by
the state of a marriage concluded according to Roma rites. The first complaint centred on
the lack of recognition of her marriage as ‘one in good faith’, which meant that she was
denied her right to a survivor’s pension. The second complaint directly concerned the
lack of official recognition of a marriage conducted in accordance with Roma traditions.
Both complaints were framed as complaints about invidious discrimination, namely that
the marriage in question was not treated the same as other comparable marriages, and
there was no reasonable and objective justification for this differential treatment. Both
complaints fundamentally turn around the question of comparability; should the complai-
nant’s marriage be recognised as a ‘good faith marriage’, and should it be officially recog-
nised as a non-civil marriage. Surprisingly, the Court adopted two radically different
reasonings in the two discrimination complaints.
In relation to the former complaint, the Court fully goes into the non-discrimination
analysis, and into the question of comparability. It investigates closely the legislation
and relevant jurisprudence and notes that the ‘constitutional case-law has […] taken
into account, in recognizing survivor’s pensions, the existence both of good faith and of
exceptional circumstances rendering the celebration of marriage impossible, even
though no legally valid marriage had taken place’.67 The Court then goes on to investigate
whether the denial of the survivor’s pension in casu
…reveals discriminatory treatment based on her affiliation to the Roma minority, in relation
to the manner in which the legislation and case-law have treated similar situations where the
64ibid para 88.
65ibid para 179. In Yordanova (Yordanova et al v Bulgaria [App no 25446/06] ECtHR 24 April 2012, para 129), the case con-
cerned expulsions of Roma from illegal make-shift houses that did not respect planning and safety regulations. The Court
only addressed the complaint about invidious racial discrimination under article 14 regarding the expulsion modalities.
The Court explicitly referred to Thlimmenos in relation to state duties to correct factual inequalities suffered by socially
disadvantaged groups, but only in terms of article 8 (para 129). In other words, the duties of differential treatment are
explicitly linked to the Thlimmenos rationale but are still summarily dealt with in terms of the substantive article 8, and
not considered in terms of article 14.
66Munoz Diaz v Spain ECtHR, 8 December 2009.
67ibid para 53.
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persons concerned believed in good faith that they were married even though the marriage
was not legally valid.68
In this case, the Court highlights the fact that the Spanish authorities had issued the clai-
mant with a number of ofﬁcial documents certifying her status as spouse of the deceased.69
In addition, the Court argues at length the obligation of public authorities to take into con-
sideration that the claimant belongs to a community within which the validity of the mar-
riage, according to its own rites and traditions, has never been disputed.70 According to the
Court ‘the force of the collective beliefs of a community that is well-deﬁned culturally
cannot be ignored’.71 Strikingly, the Court incorporates two lines of argumentation
from the Chapman judgment regarding article 8 within the assessment of the complaint
of invidious discrimination under article 14. First, the Court observes ‘the emerging inter-
national consensus among the Contracting States of the Council of Europe recognizing the
special needs of minorities and an obligation to protect their security, identity and life-
style’.72 Second, it highlights the famous Chapman quote that ‘the vulnerable position
of Roma means that some special consideration should be given to their needs and
their different lifestyle, both in the relevant regulatory framework and in reaching
decisions in particular cases’.73
In light of the above considerations the Court holds that the refusal by the Spanish
authorities to recognise the applicant’s entitlement to a survivor’s pension did not properly
take into account the applicant’s particular social and cultural situation when assessing the
good faith of the marriage, and constituted a disproportionate difference in treatment in
comparison to the treatment afforded ‘to other situations that must be considered equiv-
alent in terms of the effects of good faith’.74 The Court thus concludes to a violation of
article 14 of the ECHR.75
The other discrimination complaint inMunoz Diaz directly concerns the lack of official
recognition of a marriage concluded according to Roma rites. The applicant argued that
the non-recognition under Spanish law of Roma rites as a form of expression of
consent to marry, did not take into account the specificities of the Roma minority.
Indeed, Roma marriage consists of a form of expression of consent which was deeply
rooted in the culture of her community, and had existed over five hundred years in
Spanish history.76 However, the Court summarily dismissed the discrimination complaint
because the official recognition of certain religious forms of expression ‘is a distinction
derived from religious affiliation, which is not pertinent in the case of the Roma commu-
nity’.77 The Court’s reasoning could be seen as an attempt to avoid the non-discrimination
analysis, and the related complex questions. The prohibition of discrimination requires a
reasonable and objective justification when comparable cases are treated differently. In
68ibid para 54.
69ibid para 61.
70ibid para 59.
71ibid.
72ibid para 60.
73ibid.
74ibid paras 64–65.
75ibid para 71.
76ibid para 76.
77ibid para 80. The Court adopts a formal equality approach when focusing on the civil marriage in Spain, which is open to
everyone without distinction (paras 79–80).
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this framework it would be important to discuss the comparability of religious marriages
and Roma marriages, and identify the ‘relevant’ criteria to assess comparability.
Arguably, the focus of the first discrimination complaint, the socioeconomic impli-
cations of the expression of a separate identity, ‘merely’ requires the state to consider
Roma marriage as a marriage in good faith. Given the fact that the Spanish authorities
had de facto recognised the marriage on numerous occasions in public documents, this
is a reasonable demand. The second discrimination complaint, however, directly concerns
the expression of a separate minority identity, way of life and related norms, and would
require an assessment of state obligations to officially recognise the minority marriage
concerned. In this regard the Court is clearly not at ease in acknowledging, let alone
addressing, the discrimination complaint. The reason the Court dismissed the non-dis-
crimination complaint out of hand begs the question of the comparability of religious
and Roma marriages. Munos Diaz reveals the Court’s hesitation to explicitly engage in
non-discrimination analysis regarding complaints directly concerning the expression of
the separate minority identity. It seems the European consensus regarding minorities’ sep-
arate identity and related rights, captured in the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities and noted in the Chapman judgment, arguably does not extend to
the question of the recognition of minority marriages.78
III(2) Religious minorities, claims for accommodation and the limited support of
prohibition of discrimination
In a discussion of duties of reasonable accommodation on grounds for religion, it is useful
to analyse claims for the accommodation of religious practices and norms. Measures of
reasonable accommodation are meant to address barriers to participation that particular
(groups of) persons are confronted with in their physical or social environment. Reason-
able accommodation measures can take various forms, but they always entail some adjust-
ing of existing policies, rules, practices, or infrastructure.79 Ultimately, these measures are
about realising equal opportunities, equal access and thus substantive equality. They are
often defined in relation to employment, public services, education and social services.
These accommodation duties are not absolute, but limited to what can be considered
‘reasonable’ in the given circumstances.80
Duties of reasonable accommodation were actually conceptualised in the US and
Canada in order to accomodate religious diversity after a period of high immigration. Fur-
thermore, reviews of national regulations regarding duties of reasonable accommodation
reveal that when grounds are specified, they most often include religion.81 Admittedly, the
current international treaties and EU legislation only explicitly identify duties of
78The Court tends to leave states a broad margin of appreciation in their regulation of marriages, as long as the very
essence of the right is not impaired (in casu, para 78). See also Schalk and Kopf v Austria (App no 30141/04) ECtHR
24 June 2010.
79L Waddington, ‘Reasonable Accommodation: Time to Extend the Duty to Accommodate beyond Disability?’ (2011) 36
NJCM Bulletin 187.
80C Brunelle, Discrimination et Obligation d’accommodement raisonnable en milieu de travail syndiqé (Les Éditions Yvon Blais,
Cowansville 2001) 248–51.
81K Henrard, ‘Duties of Reasonable Accommodation in Relation to Religion and the ECtHR: A Closer Look at the Prohibition
of Discrimination, the Freedom of Religion and Related Duties of State Neutrality’ (2012) 5 Erasmus L Rev 64.
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reasonable accommodation on grounds of disability.82 Nevertheless, and as always in
human rights law, the limits of the explicit standards can be tackled through
interpretation.
Duties of reasonable accommodation can roughly be based on two grounds.
Originally, duties of reasonable accommodation were developed as a particular mani-
festation of the right to equal treatment. These duties are interrelated with two manifes-
tations of the prohibition of discrimination, namely the prohibition of indirect
discrimination and duties of differential treatment. Given the interrelation with the pro-
hibition of discrimination, duties of reasonable accommodation can in principle be
defined on all grounds of discrimination, including religion. Second, reasonable accom-
modation can also be identified as positive state obligations aimed at the effective enjoy-
ment of particular fundamental rights, such as the right to access to education.
Interestingly, duties of reasonable accommodation on grounds of religion can – in
addition to ensuring equal access to education, employment etc. – also be grounded in
the effective enjoyment of the freedom of religion.83
As late as in February 2016, the ECtHR for the first time explicitly identified duties of
reasonable accommodation in terms of article 14, in a case concerning a blind person.84
This judgment makes explicit what was implicitly present in its preceding jurisprudence
in relation to persons with a handicap, albeit confined to substantive rights.85 Strikingly,
in its ‘new’ interpretation of article 14, the Court relies heavily on the UN Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which obliges contracting states to adopt duties of
reasonable accommodation. It is therefore highly unlikely that the Court will identify
duties of reasonable accommodation on the basis of article 9 any time soon, given the
Court’s tendency to grant states a wide margin of appreciation in matters pertaining to
the elusive notion of ‘religion-state relations’ and considering the lack of a European con-
sensus on duties of reasonable accommodation on religious grounds.86
Regarding the Thlimmenos case, it was already pointed out that the identification of a
duty of differential treatment in favour of a Jehovah’s Witness can be explained, and put in
perspective, by the specific facts of that case.87 The requested differential treatment did not
entail an exemption, nor demand considerable action and efforts from the public auth-
orities. It merely imposed a differentiation to ensure that the Greek Law excluding
certain persons from the position of chartered accountant would not be over-inclusive:
someone convicted for refusing military service for religious reasons is not a person
82UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008)
2515 UNTS 3, art 5, 3; Council Directive (EC) 2000/78 ‘Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employ-
ment and Occupation’ [2000] OJL 303/16, art 5.
83See E Bribosia, J Ringelheim and I Rorive, ‘Reasonable Accommodation for Religious Minorities: A Promising Concept for
European Antidiscrimination Law?’ (2010) 7 Maastricht J Eur Comp L Rev, 137–161, 147–48. See also S Fredman, ‘Provid-
ing Equality: Substantive Equality and the Positive Duty to Provide’ (2005) 21 SA J Hum Rts 163.
84Çam v Turkey (App no 51500/08) ECtHR 23 February 2016. See also Guberina v Croatia (App no 23682/13) ECtHR 22 March
2016.
85Sentges v the Netherlands (App no 27677/02) ECtHR 8 July 2003, para 7. The Court says it grants states a wide margin of
appreciation regarding the assessment of priorities in the context of the allocation of limited state resources, it actually
does scrutinise the decisions made closely, having regard to the full range of relevant considerations.
86For an article discussing the traditional line of jurisprudence regarding the ECtHR’s approach towards duties of reasonable
accommodation on grounds of religion and its relation to the Court’s appreciation of the level of European consensus
while underscoring the need to add more nuance, see Henrard, ‘How the ECHR’s Concern’ (n 20) 398.
87It is interesting to note that in Thlimmenos the Court, after having concluded to a violation of article 14 in combination
with article 9, did not consider it necessary to also assess whether there has been a violation of article 9 taken on its own
(para 53): compare with the argumentation on the avoidance of article 14 analysis above.
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without moral virtue. The type of accommodation concerned can be considered levelling
the playing field, and the differential treatment does not amount to the active accommo-
dation of a separate minority identity. Furthermore, Thlimmenos leaves the sensitive area
of religious governance untouched since it neither changes the relative visibility of various
religions in the public sphere, nor interferes in any way with the national choices regarding
religion-state relations. The Court has been modest in identifying duties of differential
treatment on grounds of religion subsequent to Thlimmenos. The only additional duty
of differential treatment on religious grounds the Court has recognised so far is a
special investigatory duty to unveil possible religious discriminatory motives of violent
offences, and this arguably strengthens the prohibition of invidious discrimination,
more than the duty of differential treatment.88
A comprehensive analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence on duties of reasonable accom-
modation on grounds of religion has already been conducted elsewhere.89 In this section, I
will discuss a selection of cases that are most closely related to the different practices and
ways of life of religious minorities. The selection clearly demonstrates that the Court, when
evaluating complaints about insufficient accommodation of separate religious identities,
either avoids a separate non-discrimination analysis, or adopts a very shallow reasoning,
simply dismissing allegations of (indirect) discrimination.
Most complaints about failures to accommodate religious minorities in the work
environment concern sanctions for not having respected working hours in order to
attend religious services and/or respect religious holidays. In so far as the complainant
argued90 that the selection of religious holidays only accommodates the majority religion,
the difference in treatment is either denied91 or simply discarded because of consensus
arguments: ‘in most countries only religious holidays of the majority are celebrated as
public holidays.’92 In other words, de facto indirect discrimination complaints are
glossed over. The case law shows the Court’s reluctance to carve out exemptions from
or adapt rules so as to avoid a disproportionate impact on adherents to a particular
religion.
One notable exception is the Court’s reasoning which holds that it is the duty of public
authorities to make reasonable efforts to provide prisoners with a meal that conforms to
their religious prescripts.93 Nevertheless, this steady line of jurisprudence (since 1976) is
based on article 9, while the Court opines that there would be no cause for a separate
evaluation of article 14 because the inequality of treatment had already been taken into
88See Milanovic v Serbia (Application no 44614/07) ECtHR 14 December 2010. It has already been noted that the Court was
furthermore rather slow in identifying this investigatory duty for violence with a religious discriminatory intent, in com-
parison with the one related to possible racist intent.
89K Henrard, ‘Duties of Reasonable Accommodation on Grounds of Religion in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights: A Tale of Baby Steps forward and Missed Opportunities’ (2016) ICON forthcoming.
90Note that in Kosteski the discrimination claim was not so much about indirect discrimination – he complained that he was
the only person allegedly of the Muslim faith that needed to prove his allegiance in order to benefit from the accom-
modation that was provided to Muslims in terms of extra days off (so that they could honour their religious holy
days): Kosteski v the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (App no 55170/00) ECtHR 13 April 2006.
91Konttinen v Finland, EComHR Decision, 3 December 1996, DR 68, para 1; Stedman v United Kingdom, EComHR Decision, 9
April 1997, DR 89, para 3.
92X v the United Kingdom, EComHR Decision, 12 March 1981, DR 27, para 29.
93See inter alia EComHR Decision, X v UK (App no 5947/72) 5 March 1976; Jakóbski v Poland (App no 18429/06) ECtHR 7
December 2010, para 59. Note that a similar case, Vartic v Romania (no 2) (App no 14150/08) ECtHR 17 December 2013, is
only decided under article 9. The other complaints that were raised, including a violation of article 14, were summarily
dismissed by the Court as manifestly ill founded (para 69). Strikingly, these cases also do not feature the savings clause
regarding cases where a clear inequality of treatment is a fundamental aspect of the case.
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account in the analysis and finding of a violation of article 9. However, when the Court has
taken the inequality of treatment into account when evaluating the substantive right, does
this not imply that inequality is a central aspect of the case? The Court’s case law clearly
shows unwillingness to assess the discrimination complaint.
This lack of willingness is particularly visible and problematic in cases where the Court
has not found a violation of article 8, and proceeds to dismiss the article 14 complaint for
essentially the same reasons as those put forward to dismiss article 9. A good example is
the only case so far on ritual slaughter, namely Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek v France.94
Tsedek concerns a refusal to grant a dispensation for ritual slaughter to an orthodox min-
ority stream within Judaism because the national Jewish organisation had already obtained
a dispensation. The Court’s conclusion (that in so far as there was a difference of treat-
ment, it was reasonably and objectively justified), simply refers back to the reasons it
had given in the analysis under the freedom to manifest one’s religion.95 Significantly,
seven judges dissented, who emphasised that the glaring differential treatment between
religious streams is central to the case and thus merited an explicit discrimination analysis.
While this case seems to rather fit the ‘invidious discrimination’ dimension of the right to
equal treatment, it is a particular kind of invidious discrimination, more particularly
against a minority within a minority. In other words, the case illuminates the Court’s
unwillingness to undertake a non-discrimination analysis when a case fundamentally
turns around the separate minority identity and what can be expected from governments
in terms of recognition of separate minority identities.
III(3) Evaluation of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on duties of differential treatment
regarding ethnic and religious minorities
The preceding section has demonstrated that the ECtHR is willing to identify a need for
differential treatment of persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities – in principle
at least, but first and foremost in terms of substantive articles, and not in terms of the pro-
hibition of discrimination.96 The Court tends to opine that the analysis in terms of the sub-
stantive rights precludes the need to also evaluate the discrimination complaint, or simply
repeats a finding of non-violation for the reasons set out in terms of the substantive rights.
This is unfortunate, because it treats the discrimination analysis as if it does not have any
independent value or does not have a distinct legal framework, which can be differentiated
94Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek v France (App no 27417/95) ECtHR 27 June 2010. Another line of jurisprudence that merits
discussion here is the string of cases concerning prohibitions of religious dress by students in public educational insti-
tutions and the more recent case on the burqa ban in the public space in France. In these cases the Court first established
that there was no violation of article 9, due to the state’s broad margin of appreciation in the matter, and then summarily
dismissed the article 14 claim for the same reasons. In some of these cases the Court also dismissed the article 14 com-
plaint because the contested measure was not aimed at a particular religion, without contemplating a possible instance
of indirect discrimination. The most relevant cases here are Leyla Sahin v Turkey (App no 44774/98) ECtHR 10 November
2005, Aktas v France (App no 43563/08) ECtHR 17 July 2009, Dogru v France (App no 27058/05) ECtHR 4 December 2008
and SAS v France (App no 43835/11) ECtHR 1 July 2014. See also P Lenta, ‘Cultural and Religious Accommodations to
School Uniform Regulations: Case Comments’ (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 259.
95Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek ECtHR, para 87.
96This is inter alia visible in the line of the headscarf cases discussed more fully below. Traditionally, complaints about (de
facto) indirect discrimination were countered by the statement that these rules were not targeted at a particular religious
conviction. In the more recent SAS v France judgment the Court exhibits a good understanding of what ‘indirect discrimi-
nation’ is about. Nevertheless, in the latter case the Court still summarily dismisses the complaint by referring back to the
reasoning under articles 8 and 9.
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from the substantive rights framework. Furthermore, this type of reasoning also fails to
explore and clarify the potential of Thlimmenos’ duties of differential treatment for
persons belonging to minorities. In so doing, it also fails to complement (give effect to)
the Chapman state obligations to take into account the special needs and characteristics
of minorities in devising relevant legislative frameworks and reaching decisions in particu-
lar cases.
Interestingly, in a few judgments on complaints that pertain to the accommodation of
the separate minority identity, the Court did explicitly engage in a non-discrimination
analysis. However, these complaints were actually complaints about unjustified disadvan-
tageous differential treatment and thus about invidious discrimination. These judgements
show that the Court seems (increasingly) willing to engage in a non-discrimination analy-
sis which balances the respective interests but only to the extent that the complaint con-
cerns primarily the socioeconomic access-rights of the expression of that separate identity
(access to a job = Thlimmenos; access to a survivor’s pension =Munos Dias), and does not
imply a restructuring of the public sphere or the visibility of these distinctive ways of life of
ethnic and religious minorities.These cases rather confirm the heightened reluctance of the
Court to address complaints that directly concern the manifestation of a separate minority
identity.
IV. Conclusion
Throughout the preceding analysis of the Court’s case law, the argument has been devel-
oped that the Court’s non-discrimination jurisprudence reveals a different speed of devel-
opment for the the ‘prohibition of invidious discrimination’ track and the ‘duties of
differential treatment’ track. The more nuanced assessment of the Court’s non-discrimi-
nation jurisprudence implies that it is no longer tenable to qualify this jurisprudence as
‘poor’ in general. Furthermore, this assessment also counters the argument that the
Court’s poor jurisprudence on non discrimination is due to the fact that article 14
ECHR is merely accessory. Indeed, if this was an important factor, it would need to
play out similarly for both dimensions of the right to equal treatment, quod non.
In relation to cases regarding alleged invidious discrimination, the Court tends to
engage explicitly with the complaint in terms of the prohibition of discrimination,
while adopting high levels of scrutiny in regard to differentiations on the basis of ethnicity
and religion. Admittedly, there are ongoing flaws in the jurisprudence on the allocation of
the burden of proof, and particularly the identification of a prima facie case of direct dis-
crimination. Nevertheless, the Court seems to be willing to test (and develop) the bound-
aries, even in regards to the latter.
A markedly different picture emerges concerning duties of differential treatment in
terms of the prohibition of discrimination. The analysis of the selected case law confirms
that the Court avoids as much as possible non-discrimination analysis in cases on claims
to official recognition of separate identities and ways of life of ethnic and religious min-
orities. This transpires clearly from the cases on Roma’s own way of life in caravans,
since the Court chooses to identify de facto duties of differential treatment in terms of
article 8, not in terms of article 14 (in combination with article 8).
Similarly, a range of cases on religious minorities and their complaints about a lack of
accommodation of their separate religious identity show a Court that prefers to conduct its
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analysis in terms of article 9 (or 2, protocol 1 for educational matters). Subsequently, the
discrimination complaint is summarily dismissed, regularly not acknowledging that this
complaint has independent value. Indeed, in the few cases in which the Court concluded
to a violation of article 9 (or article 2, protocol 1) in itself, the Court argues that it would no
longer be necessary to also consider the article 14 complaint. Admittedly, the Court had
added in some of its judgments the proviso that it would still be important to assess the
non-discrimination complaint in those instances where the clear inequality of treatment
would be a fundamental aspect of the case. The preceding case law has nicely demon-
strated, though, that the identification of the latter criterion is a question of interpretation
about which different views (can) exist, also within the Court. More problematically, in the
many cases where the Court had concluded that the substantive article is not violated, the
Court invokes the same reasons (referring back to the reasoning in terms of the substan-
tive article) to conclude that the prohibition of discrimination is also not violated.
Arguably, demands for reasonable accommodation of different ethnic and religious
identities are on the rise in the current era of globalisation and ever diversifying migration
streams. In line with the subsidiarity principle underlying the ECHR, the Court is not sup-
posed to impose uniform standards on all states.97 Nevertheless, it remains important that
the ECtHR actually provides guidance about the benchmarks that member states need to
take into account when developing policies, legislation, and practices, in order to live up
to their commitment to respect fundamental rights. Consequenlty, the Court is urged to
engage more explicitly and properly in non-discrimination analysis, also in relation to
complaints about a lack of differential treatment (accommodation), while identifying
and weighing the respective interests. This more explicit reasoning will also enable the
Court to clarify the potential (and limits) of the Thlimmenos rationale for minorities,
their separate identity and related practices and ways of life.98
97Inter alia J Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the ECHR (Brill, 2009).
98It appears appropriate to highlight that these questions of accommodation of ethnic and religious minorties are arguably
closely related to discussions on legal pluralism and human rights. Put differently, the potential for cross-fertilisation
between these respective frames of analysis arguably merits a closer investigation. See for example, J Gadirov,
‘Freedom of Religion and Legal Pluralism’ in MLP Loenen and JE Goldschmidt (eds), Religious Pluralism and Human
Rights in Europe: Where to Draw the Line? (Intersentia, 2007) 85; P Macklem, ‘Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and
the Paradox of Self-determination’ (2006) ICON 497; H Quane, ‘Legal Pluralism and International Human Rights Law:
Inherently Compatible, Mutually Reinforcing or Something in Between?’ (2013) OJLS 688.
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